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The Mizan Newsletter aims at giving an objective and balanced account of current Soviet writings on the Middle East

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In this issue Soviet policy towards the Middle East countries is examined in the wider contexts of, firstly, the Soviet attitude towards Western alliances of which Middle East countries are members, and, secondly, the Soviet attitude towards the Afro-Asian bloc and the Bandung movement.

The Middle East and Western Strategy: The Soviet View discusses whether, in the Soviet view, peaceful co-existence is feasible with the Western alliances as at present constituted. It suggests that, in the climate of the detente following Khrushchev's visit to the USA, notions to this effect were winning some acceptance, but that preoccupation with the military aspects of the Western alliances gained the upper hand.

Bandung: The Fifth Anniversary recalls the ideals which inspired the sponsors of the Bandung Conference of April 1955, and contrasts these with the aims of the Afro-Asian solidarity movement today as projected in Soviet writings. It examines the stages by which Soviet identification of the Bandung movement with Soviet ideals has come about, despite the fact that the Soviet Union is a European power.

Soviet warnings to Turkey and Persia following the U-2 incident are reported in Soviet Angle on the News. It is noted that Middle East reaction to the breakdown of the summit conference has not been found suitable for quoting in Soviet newspapers. Soviet comments on the change of Government in Turkey are reported, and Soviet warnings about the present policy of the Persian Government.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND WESTERN STRATEGY: THE SOVIET VIEW

The central theme in current Soviet writing about the Middle East countries bordering the Soviet Union - Turkey and Persia - is their relationship with the Western Powers, and above all with the USA. The adherence of these countries to Western military alliances is denounced as an act of hostility against the Soviet Union. However, undue hostility to legitimate defence precautions might in itself appear to justify the suspicions which prompt these precautions; and it is perhaps for this reason that Soviet polemics on this subject have usually been directed more against the Western powers, as the originators of the allegedly "aggressive" pacts, than against the Middle East member States themselves. Soviet concern for the latter's welfare - allegedly threatened by these military commitments - is claimed as a leading reason for Soviet condemnation of the Western alliances.

A formidable range of arguments against the Western alliances, as seen from the point of view of the Middle East peoples, has been built up - that they are a crippling economic burden on the participant countries, that they are a cover for foreign economic and political control and a new form of colonialism, that they are used by unpopular rulers to obtain military support against their own peoples, etc. Such arguments are a permanent ingredient in Soviet writing about the situation of Turkey and Persia today, and articles on these themes vary little except in the selection of supporting data. In contrast, the more immediate Soviet preoccupation with the allegedly "aggressive" nature of the Western alliances receives expression in varying degrees, apparently according to the Soviet view of the international situation. Perhaps most often, the epithet "aggressive" is attached without explanation, as if the matter were self-evident to the reader; but at other times it is accompanied by a more or less precise indication of Soviet assessment of Western "aggressive" aims.

Aggression as a Western aim It is evidently the Soviet view that a new threat to Soviet security emerged with the conclusion of US bilateral military agreements with Turkey and Persia early in 1959; and Soviet pronouncements at that time attributed to the USA the most far-reaching aggressive aims. A Soviet memorandum to Persia of 28th December 1958 spoke of "ever increasing cooperation between Persia and the aggressive forces of third powers which do not hide their desire to use Persia and Persian territory against the Soviet Union". A NEW TIMES article said that Persia was allying itself with "a country that makes no secret of its insensate plans to wipe the Soviet Union off the face of the earth". According to an editorial in INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS of January 1959, "the aggressive blocs formed over the past few years by the rulers of

the United States, Britain and France are imperialism's principal instrument for preparing a new war". In an article in the same number of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS B. Tomilin said that the US bilateral agreements with Turkey, Persia and Pakistan were part of Anglo-US "imperialist schemes against the Socialist countries".

During 1959 Soviet views of Western intentions began to be expressed differently in different contexts. In an editorial in INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS of September 1959, on Khrushchev's forthcoming visit to the USA, the view was expressed that "understanding of the real task of statesmen today - the safeguarding of peace - is gaining ground in principal capitalist countries like Britain and the United States". But in the same issue, in an article on "Military Bases and American Strategic Doctrine", B. Teplinskiy said that the continued expansion of the chain of US missile bases was accompanied by US assertions about the need for a "preventive blow" and for "striking first"; at the XXIst CPSU Congress, he recalled, Marshal Malinovskiy "stated that some hotheads among the American militarists were clamouring for a preventive war against the Soviet Union within the next two years".

The view that the Western powers were no longer actively preparing war seems to have gained ground following Khrushchev's visit to the USA; according to an INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS editorial on the results of the visit, "the politicians of the imperialist States can no longer ignore the self-evident truth that a policy of new war preparations may prove catastrophic for the very sponsors of such a course". But, once again, another contributor to the journal admonished readers about Western "aggressive" aims; M. Lvov, writing on "NATO's Mediterranean Nuclear-Rocket Axis", spoke of the possibility that "the most belligerent circles in NATO" might "start a war and make use of their nuclear-rocket vantage ground in the Mediterranean".

Western alliances and peaceful co-existence It is now evident that there were - at least until the breakdown of the summit meeting - two directions in Soviet thinking: one was that the Western alliances did not preclude peaceful co-existence, and the other was that the alliances, and in particular the chain of US bases, constituted an intolerable provocation. Thus, in the INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS editorial quoted above, the writer said:

> "The Soviet Union has no intention of setting the United States at odds with its allies and partners, of injuring them in any way. The Soviet peoples hope that improved US-Soviet relations will, in turn, help to normalize the relations of the USSR with all countries that are allied to the USA."

Presumably, according to this thinking, Soviet friendship with for example Turkey and Persia would be possible, even as allies of the USA; and no doubt it was in this spirit that the exchange of visits between Menderes and Khrushchev was arranged, being warmly welcomed in the Soviet Union as a step towards improving Turkish-Soviet relations (MIZAN NEWSLETTER No. 5 of 1960, p.11). On the other hand, friendship with Persia, while the latter remains an ally of the USA, does not seem to be contemplated. According to NEW TIMES No.7 of 1960, Persia must "go back to a policy of neutrality and non-involvement in the war blocs of foreign powers.... Only that way a promising future lies."

Soviet denunciation of the Western alliances, as such, had perhaps been less strident in recent months; and there had been more talk of "crises" and "contradictions" within the alliances. On the other hand, there had been an increasing volume of indignant comment on the growing number of US bases - particularly missile bases - in countries bordering the Soviet Union. Some articles on this subject were accompanied by maps showing the disposition of the bases in relation to the Soviet Union. Articles such as B. Teplinskiy's "The Missile Business in the USA" (INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, April 1960) were used to support the Soviet demand for disarmament; others, such as M. Lazarev's article on US bases surrounding the Soviet Union (MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA No.12 of 1959), demanded the liquidation of US bases in foreign territory as a prerequisite for peaceful co-existence. Lazarev quoted, in support of his contention, Khrushchev's speech at the Supreme Soviet session in October 1959:

> "One can hardly say that a State is contributing to peace which has adopted more or less as the main principle of its policy the provision of its national territory for foreign atomic rocket bases directed against the Soviet Union."

Soviet views since the summit conference It is thus evident that, despite all peaceful co-existence initiatives, Soviet sensitivity about Western military intentions had been increasing for some months before the summit conference. Comment since the summit conference has centred on what a NEW TIMES commentator (N. Sergeyeva, in No.22 of 1960) calls "Washington's provocative position". This, according to Sergeyeva, "stems from the illusion that America can dominate over the world"; Washington "persists in refusing to recognize the bankruptcy of 'positions of strength'". Breakdown of the Western alliances, rather than accommodation with their members, is again looked to as offering the best hope:

> "Another bastion in the US system of war blocs, Turkey, is... shaken by grave internal convulsions. A regime that is based on American armed force and American money cannot be

healthy and stable. And the cracking of such regimes is also the cracking of the system of military alliances that underpins America's foreign policy."

The following week NEW TIMES observed that Menderes was "not the first man Washington has placed its stake on in its game of 'global strategy' who has found himself relegated to the scrap heap of history because of his close connections with it". Where would it next happen, the writer asked - in Jordan or Persia? Turkey's alliance, "as the U-2 incident has revealed", made Turkey "an accomplice in military provocations". The same issue contained a virulent attack by A. Leonidov on the Shah of Persia and the Persian ruling class ("an utterly corrupt court clique"); greed for oil profits and "fear of the awakening people", said Leonidov, had "made these high-placed adventurers agree to turn Iran into a doomed outpost of the CENTO war bloc". But the people of Persia were "silent no longer", and "only the blind and the deaf can fail to perceive the portents of a storm".

It would thus appear that any development of Soviet thinking towards rapprochement with Turkey and Persia, without detriment to their Western alliances, has now suffered a sharp reverse. The inevitability of "breakdown of the imperialist system" has always been a fundamental tenet of Soviet doctrine, even if the "peaceful co-existence" motif has sometimes apparently submerged it. Now again it is being openly voiced: "the relation of forces does not favour the imperialists, the future is not on their side" - such sentiments (NEW TIMES No.23 of 1960) indicate that the present Soviet attitude is one of waiting on events.

BANDUNG: THE FIFTH ANNIVERSARY

During the five years since the Bandung Conference - whose anniversary has been widely advertised in Soviet writings - identification of the Bandung movement with Soviet ideals has become a feature of Soviet pronouncements on the subject. It is perhaps worth considering how and by what stages this has come about, and whether in fact the identification is a valid one.

The Bandung ideals The ideal of cooperation between the Asian and African States in a common front was put forward as early as August 1953 by the Indonesian Prime Minister Sastroamidjojo. In April 1954, coincident with the five-power meeting in Geneva to discuss the questions of Korea and Indo-China, the Prime Ministers of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia met in Colombo to decide how best the moral weight of

united Asian opinion could be used to tip the scales in favour of peace as between the two great power blocs. Sir John Kotelawala, on whose initiative the Colombo conference was called, claims in his autobiography (AN ASIAN PRIME MINISTER'S STORY, 1956) that the deliberations and conclusions of these Asian statesmen had a "very salutary effect on the negotiations at Geneva" and "tipped the balance in bringing about the settlement in Indo-China". In December 1954 the same Prime Ministers held a further meeting at Bogor in Indonesia, at which they specified the purposes of the conference which it was proposed to hold at Bandung in April 1955. These were, to promote good will and cooperation among the nations of Asia and Africa and to advance their mutual interests; to consider their social, economic and cultural problems; to consider problems of special interest to Asian and African problems, including the problems of racialism and colonialism; and to view the position of these peoples in the world today and the contribution they could make to world peace and cooperation.

Thus the original inspiration of the conference was not primarily anti-colonialist, and far less anti-Western. Indeed, its sponsors saw their task as that of bringing to bear a new outside force of moderation and peaceful compromise upon the two great contending world forces.

A striking feature of the Bandung Conference was the diversity of ideological outlook among the delegates, who nevertheless were able to reach agreement on the formulation of a common statement of aims. The delegates of Ceylon, the Philippines, Iraq and Turkey made speeches vigorously attacking Communism, and other delegates, such as those of Thailand and South Vietnam, uttered warningsagainst the danger of Communist infiltration. At the other extreme, the delegates of China and North Vietnam denounced the policy of the Western powers towards Asian and African countries. The delegates of Middle Eastern countries voiced their preoccupations with the policies of the Western powers and Israel. The doctrine of non-violence found expression in the speeches of the delegates of India, Ceylon and Burma. Pandit Nehru in his speech at the concluding session declared:

> "We mean no ill to anybody. We send our greetings to Europe and America. We send our greetings to Australia and New Zealand. And indeed Australia and New Zealand are almost in our region....I should like them to come nearer to Asia. I would welcome them because I do not want what we say or do to be based on racial prejudices. We have had enough of this racialism elsewhere."

The final communique of the conference was a lengthy and comprehensive document, covering economic and cultural cooperation, human rights and self-determination, the problems of dependent peoples, UN

representation of Asian and African countries, atomic disarmament, etc. But there was one passage in it which was to be seized upon by all Communist commentators: "The Conference is agreed in declaring that colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end." This, together with the affirmations of solidarity with anti-colonialist causes in North Africa, Southern Arabia and West Irian, was to be presented by Soviet commentators as the keynote of the entire conference.

Soviet projection of the Bandung Conference To interpret the Bandung Conference to the Soviet public was not a straightforward matter. Questions of both ideology and prestige were involved.

Communism had been denounced by a number of delegates at the conference; and these same delegates had approved the conference's statement of aims. If anti-Communists had found a common cause with non-Communists and Communists (Chinese and Vietnamese) the matter obviously required some explanation.

The principal Soviet exponents of the conference were I.P. Plyshevskiy and Ye. Zhukov, both of whom were present at Bandung for the conference. Plyshevskiy (SOVETSKOYE VOSTOKOVEDENIYE No.3 of 1955) said that when the conference was first called the Governments of such Western-allied countries as Turkey, Thailand and the Philippines had been "negatively disposed" towards it, but that at the SEATO meeting in Bangkok in February 1955 participation was decided on with a view to disrupting the conference, and this line was adopted by the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and Ceylon. But at Bandung, said Plyshevskiy, these delegates with their "hackneyed phraseology borrowed from the arsenal of the champions of colonialism", could make no impression on delegates who knew from experience "that it is not the countries of the democratic camp but the imperialist powers who try to preserve the colonial regime, enforce racial discrimination, establish their military bases on foreign territory, try to use dependent peoples as cannon-fodder and threaten other countries". In the face of such opposition, "the delegates from pro-American countries were compelled to vote for resolutions denouncing colonialism and the imperialists' preparations for a new world war".

More fundamental ideological difficulties were presented by the Bandung principles themselves and the spirit in which they were put forward. Soviet Communists could not suddenly accept a new ideology formulated by non-Communists; if it was to be accepted, it had to be shown that it was in keeping with Communist doctrine.

The principles relating to peaceful co-existence perhaps presented least difficulty. Panch Shila, the Five Principles, embodied in the Sino-Indian Pact of June 1954 (mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity; non-aggression; non-interference in each other's internal affairs; recognition of equality; peaceful co-existence) had been adhered to by the Supreme Soviet in its declaration of 9th February 1955. But even in this case Soviet authorities were concerned to emphasize the Leninist orthodoxy of the principles this adopted; Prof. V. Durdenevskiy, in MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN' No.3 of 1956, analysed each of the Five Principles in turn and declared its conformity with, if not development from, Leninist doctrine. Ye. Zhukov, in his article on the Bandung Conference (INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS No.5 of 1955) was careful to point out that "the principle of co-existence and peaceful competition between the two systems, socialism and capitalism, was first substantiated and formulated by the great Lenin".

The question of Soviet ideological support for eastern nationalist movements presented a more complex problem. Soviet writers could not afford to give the impression of wholesale approval of eastern nationalism. Zhukov observed:

> "The contemporary anti-imperialist, anti-colonial movement in Asia and Africa is not a uniform movement of revolutionary-minded masses. People who are opposed to revolutionary measures are also taking part in it. What is more, even direct agents of imperialism and adventurers of all kinds are tagging along."

But, Zhukov concluded, "objectively this great movement is smashing imperialist domination and for this reason it is an expression of the onward march of history". Communists could and indeed should cooperate with this movement; "in the common struggle against colonialism...the cooperation of the most varied parties and organizations, including Communists and nationalists, is quite possible and practically necessary." Lenin had pointed out that the struggle of the eastern peasant masses was directed primarily not against capital but against survivals of feudalism, and that in this struggle bourgeois nationalism had a historical role to fulfil. Lenin had also emphasized "that it is obligatory for the politically conscious Communist proletariat in all countries to devote special attention to national feeling in the countries that have suffered longest under oppression".

The USSR and the Afro-Asian movement The voice of the Soviet Union, as a European power, was not heard at the Bandung Conference. The moral initiative of the Bandung movement lay in Asia and Africa. Some might consider that exclusiveness was part of its appeal. To what extent could a European power like Soviet Russia regard it as a reliable ally?

Soviet apprehensions that the new self-assertiveness of eastern nations might take an anti-Soviet turn have found expression in various ways. It is one thing when Soviet spokesmen themselves speak about the moral superiority of eastern nations over their Western colonizers; it is quite another when the East claims for itself a spiritual superiority over Europe. Thus Ye. Zhukov, in his article on the Bandung Conference, attacked those delegates who, noting "the high standards of spiritual culture which mark the historical development of the peoples of Asia", sought "to explain in a one-sided way the contemporary historical process, and particularly the post-war resurgence in Asia, as being due to this". This, he said, had led them to "the far-reaching conclusion about the spiritual superiority of the East over the West".

Zhukov's attack was directed particularly against eastern advocates of the doctrine of non-violence. Similarly I. Potekhin, in his article on the Accra Conference of African Peoples (INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS No.2 of 1959) denounced "the spirit of non-resistance to violence which permeates the utterances of many leaders of this /the Pan-African/ movement". But it is undoubtedly the claims of Asian and African nationalists to ideological self-sufficiency that mainly provoke Soviet resentment.

The question whether Russia herself belongs to the East or the West seems to have exercised the minds of Soviet thinkers, although the dilemma is not openly admitted. In THE MYTH OF THE OPPOSITION OF EAST AND WEST (Moscow 1958) E. A. Bagramov affirms that "West and East are geographical concepts which in themselves contribute nothing to understanding the destinies of world civilization and the history of social development". Bagramov is concerned to show the unreality of Western concepts of a free and civilized West facing an uncivilized and partly Communist East. In doing so he speaks with pride of the Soviet Union's place in a Communist East stretching from Eastern Europe to China; but his championship of eastern civilization and culture is very much that of a European partisan of Asian causes.

The Soviet Union's claim to a place in the Afro-Asian movement appears to have been in Soviet minds from the outset. It is significant that the Supreme Soviets of the Uzbek, Kazakh, Turkmen, Kirgiz and Tadzhik Soviet Republics sent messages of good wishes to the Bandung Conference; and the situation of the peoples of these Republics, where "the Russian working class has won the friendship of all the peoples who formerly were oppressed in the Russian Empire", was referred to by Ye. Zhukov in his article on the conference. Zhukov was also able to quote from Lenin a passage about the solidarity of "all the peoples of Asia and semi-Asia" in the struggle against imperialism.

The Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement Soviet anxiety to be identified with the Bandung movement was shown in the attention which the Bandung Conference received at the XXth CPSU Congress. It was no doubt one of the factors which led to the adjustment of the Soviet attitude to bourgeois nationalism, which received official confirmation at that congress.

By 1957, with the second anniversary of the Bandung Conference, demands for a second Afro-Asian conference were receiving notice in the Soviet press. In the first number of SOVREMENNYY VOSTOK (July 1957) B. Gafurov noted the number of official Soviet visits to Asian and African countries in the preceding two years: Khrushchev and Bulganin had visited India, Burma and Afghanistan; Mikoyan had visited Pakistan, India, Burma, Vietnam, China and the Mongolian People's Republic; Marshal Zhukov had visited India and Burma; and Soviet Government and parliamentary delegations had visited China, Syria, Persia, Ghana, Tunisia and Liberia. In a series of joint communiques the Soviet Union had undertaken to "be led by the spirit and principles of the Bandung Conference".

By 1957 the centre of gravity of what was now known as the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement had shifted to Cairo; and in the Soviet Union the Committee of Solidarity of the Asian Countries had built up a nation-wide organization. Before the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference opened in Cairo on 26th December 1957 meetings to publicize the conference had been held in Moscow and in Tashkent, Alma-Ata, Ashkhabad, Stalinabad, Frunze, Baku, Tiflis and Erevan. The Soviet delegation to the conference was led by S. Rashidov. In his speech to the conference Rashidov spole of how "the peoples of Soviet Central Asia and Soviet Transcaucasia had to wage a long and arduous struggle, and to suffer incredible sacrifices, in their fight for liberation". He also said that the Republics of Central Asia and Transcaucasia had "completely refuted the lying fabrications of the ideologists of colonialism about the alleged incapacity of eastern peoples for independent development and progress". The Soviet contribution to the conference could thus be presented on an Asian and anti-colonialist basis. But the Soviet delegates also took the opportunity to speak at length about the Soviet Union's full support for the aspirations of Asian and African peoples; and, in particular, much was said about Soviet willingness to help these people to build up their national economies.

Soviet commentators noted with approval that the Cairo conference was a meeting of peoples, and not, like the Bandung Conference, a meeting of States. In effect, the Bandung movement had evolved from a statesman-like initiative on the level of world politics into a stereotyped organization whose main function was to publicize anti-colonialist causes. To such an organization Soviet Communists could lend their support without any misgivings. But is this organization an effective channel of Afro-Asian sentiment? This question Soviet writers do not seem to have yet asked themselves.

If the desire for neutrality between the Western and Communist blocs still remains a force in Afro-Asian sentiment, it has received little Soviet recognition as such. Notice has sometimes been taken of the prevalence of genuinely neutralist views, as for example among Arab nationalists; these have been sharply attacked (MIZAN NEWSLETTER No.11 of 1959, pp. 2-3). The Bandung movement itself is presented as a solid ally of the Soviet Union.

SOVIET ANGLE ON THE NEWS

Below are reviewed reports on Middle East events appearing in Soviet newspapers and periodicals during the period 4th May - 19th June.

The U-2 incident and the Summit Conference PRAVDA of 14th May published in full the Soviet Note to Turkey concerning the U-2 incident. This declared that, by offering its territory to the USA for the construction of military bases and for aggressive acts by US aircraft against the Soviet Union, the Turkish Government made itself an accomplice of such acts "and thereby incurs the heavy responsibility for the possible dangerous consequences of such acts". If such provocations were repeated the Soviet Government would be compelled to take appropriate counter measures. "It is well known that the Soviet Union has at its disposal the means which if necessary will permit it completely to render harmless (obezvredit') military bases used for the commission of aggressive actions against the Soviet Union. It goes without saying that the entire responsibility for the consequences lies both on the Governments of states committing aggression against other countries, and on those which are accomplices of this aggression." (For the Soviet Note to Persia of 14th May, see below under Persia).

Marshal Malinovskiy, in his speech at the congress of Soviet labour brigades on 31st June, said on the same subject: "We can...tell Mr. Allen Dulles that I, as Soviet Defence Minister, have given an order to the Commander-in-Chief of Rocket Forces to strike at the take-off base of an aircraft if only the space (prostranstvo) of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries is violated. This is a fully legitimate measure, for we do not know what the intruder aircraft is carrying; it may after all be carrying a hydrogen bomb."

Initial reactions of some Middle East countries to the U-2 incident were reported in the Soviet press. In PRAVDA of 10th May Demchenko, reporting from Baghdad, said that "great indignation" had been expressed in Iraqi newspapers at "the provocative activities of the American militarists" in sending a reconnaissance aircraft into Soviet airspace;

this showed that US imperialist circles wanted to prevent a cessation of the cold war, and the Soviet Union had resolutely unmasked these attempts to poison the international atmosphere on the eve of the Summit Conference. Similarly Belyayev, reporting from Cairo, said that the UAR public had denounced the provocative activities of the USA; but the Arabs wished Khrushchev success at the Summit Conference, since they knew that he would represent and defend their interests also.

Reports on Middle East reactions to the failure of the Summit Conference were entirely absent from the Soviet press. This is perhaps not suprising; comments in both the Iraqi and the UAR press lacked the uncompromising anti-Western tone necessary for Soviet quotation. For example, AL-JUMHURIYAH (Cairo) observed:

> "Threats, intimidation and violence have become the stamp of world events since the collapse of the Summit Conference... We do not wish to hold either of the two parties responsible for what has happened...The peace-loving peoples believe that what has happened at the Summit Conference does not reassure mankind or give grounds for confidence in future developments between the leaders of the two blocs."

AL-WAHDAH (Damascus) expressed the neutralist attitude:

> "The world, which has begun to founder in the whirlpool of a horrible and terrifying crisis, is waiting for whoever will come forward to rescue it from its crisis. The peoples of the world, particularly the small peoples which have been oppressed by the strife of the two camps, look upon the positive neutrality States as a force capable, if they ever came forward to act, of helping in getting the world out of its crisis...The States which have adopted positive neutrality, foremost among which are India, Yugoslavia, Indonesia and the UAR, are called to respond to world opinion and exert their efforts."

Baghdad newspapers equally failed to attach to the West the entire blame for the failure of the conference.

Turkey Soviet newspapers reported factually and without comment the disturbances in Turkey which preceded the coup d'etat, and the security measures imposed by the Menderes Government. Reports on the military coup of 27th May were similarly published, in considerable detail, without comment until 1st June. Soviet recognition of the new Turkish Government was announced on 1st June.

Statements on foreign policy by the new Turkish leaders received attention. The first reports on the coup noted the new regime's affirmation of loyalty to NATO and CENTO. A PRAVDA report (3.6.60) on the press conference given by the new Turkish Foreign Minister Selim Sarper, however, noted that Sarper, while declaring that there would be no radical changes in Turkish foreign policy, "emphasized that there will be certain new nuances in its practical implementation": he had said that the new Government was resolved to go further in the matter of the defence of the country's independence and sovereignty, and that Turkey would build her relations with all countries exclusively on a basis of equality.

The first Soviet press comment on the coup was a long article in IZVESTIYA (1.6.60) entitled "Tumbling Support". Western commentators, said the writer, were agreed that events in Turkey, whatever their further development might be, had "dealt a powerful blow to the myth of the solidity of the so-called 'free world'". They were now criticizing Menderes for having violated democratic traditions; they overlooked the fact "that the American bosses themselves drove the Ankara leaders on to suppress democratic liberties, knowing that this was the best means of keeping Turkey, and other countries of the 'free world', in the Atlantic harness". The article concluded:

> "The American imperialists and their lackeys could not stop the flame of the people's anger in Turkey from bursting forth. This anger is growing in other countries also which belong to the 'free world' but which in fact epitomize the situation of popular masses oppressed and deprived of all rights."

On 3rd June PRAVDA VOSTOKA and other Central Asian papers published an article on the events in Turkey by A. Stupak, the writer on Middle East affairs; many readers, said the paper, had written to ask for information. Stupak gave an account of the fortunes of the Turkish political parties since 1950, the growth of discontent with the Menderes Government among the public and in the army, and the repressive measures which finally led up to the coup d'etat. He concluded: "The events in Turkey graphically demonstrate how insecure are regimes which pursue a policy which does not accord with the aspirations of the peoples and the interests of peace."

Soviet newspapers on 3rd June noted that it was the 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey. On this occasion they recalled the friendly relations which had existed from the first between the Turkey of Kemal Ataturk and the Soviet Union and noted that the new Turkish Government had affirmed its devotion to Ataturk's principles of peace at home and abroad and friendly relations with all countries. Khrushchev's reference to relations with Turkey, made in his speech to the congress of labour brigades on 28th June, was widely quoted:

"We hope that the new Government of Turkey will make the necessary efforts for the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union. As regards the Soviet Government, we have been striving for this for a long time. We hope that good sense and a genuine understanding of the need to live in peace and friendship, as good neighbours, will prevail in Turkey."

Persia PRAVDA of 15th May published the text of the Soviet Note warning Persia of the consequences of violation of Soviet airspace, in connection with the CENTO military and air force manoeuvres of 14th-18th May. The Note said that the US Government had "proclaimed as its State policy the infringement of the sovereignty and inviolability of the frontiers of other States, as well as espionage and diversion", and therefore to allow such a State to make use of the airspace of countries bordering the USSR could only be considered as a hostile act against the USSR and a contravention of Soviet-Persian treaties, and in particular the Soviet-Persian Treaty of 26th February 1921.

The death sentences passed on five "Azerbayjani democrats" on 4th May, and the sentences of life imprisonment passed on 17 others, were the occasion for long articles in Soviet newspapers denouncing the Shah's regime (IZVESTIYA 12.5.60; PRAVDA 1.6.60; TRUD 3.6.60). Those sentenced, it was noted, had been accused of preparing a "Communist plot", and of having links with foreign States; but in fact their only crime was to defend the national independence of their country. There was not a single year of the present Shah's reign that had not been marked by savage reprisals against the population, beginning with the brutal reprisals against Azerbayjani and Kurdish democrats in the first years of his reign. In the Shah's Persia it had become the tradition to carry out executions whenever some new act of treachery to the people was being prepared, as on the eve of handing over Persia's oil to the Consortium, on the eve of Persia's accession to the Baghdad Pact, on the eve of the Shah's visit to the USA in 1958, etc. Fear of the growth of the national liberation movement in the Middle East had led the Shah and his Government to conclude the bilateral military agreement with the USA, under which the USA promised Persia assistance in the event of "indirect aggression". Khrushchev had remarked in his speech of 28th May:

"What is concealed behind the reference in this treaty to 'indirect' aggression? By 'indirect' aggression is meant an attempt by the oppressed people to rise in struggle for its liberation from its oppressors. In this way the USA has assumed the shameful role of gendarme - it has committed itself to come to the rescue of a regime against which the anger of the people is rising."

The Cairo spy trial Soviet newspapers reported in some detail the trial in Cairo of a group of persons accused of spying on behalf of Israel. It was particularly noted that the accused had admitted that their organization also had close links with the USA and with NATO.

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